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1 Introduction 
During the seventies the so-called "disequilibrium theory" shifted the eco-
nomic adjustments from prices to quantities. The fundamental criticism 
against Walrasian models is that prices in many real markets do not ad-
just instantaneously to clear the market. Transactions are thus made at 
non- Walrasian prices and the economic agents may face some type of quan-
tity rationing l ." Malinvaud's (1977) lectures, based on Barro and Gross-
man (1971), apply the notion of a fixed price equilibrium to macroeconomic 
problems, integrating in a unified framework both Keynesian and Classical 
macroeconomic policies. Disequilibrium models have yielded interesting em-
pirical results, in particular under the "aggregation over micromarkets in dis-
equilibrium" hypothesis 2 • This literature sees the economy as the aggregation 
of a large number of small heterogeneous markets, each one being constrained 
by demand or supply. Under some plausible assumptions on the distribution 
of supplies and demands over micromarkets, aggregate production is a func-
tion of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Lambert (1988) identifies 
sufficient conditions to approximate the aggregate production as a CES func-
tion, whose arguments are aggregate demand and aggregate capacity3. 
During the eighties a considerable effort was devoted to the search for 
an endogenous explanation of the price formation process in macroeconomic 
models, originating what is known as the "New Keynesian" approach. In 
this approach, endogenous price rigidities essentially depend on market im-
perfections and "menu costs" (the costs of changing prices)4. 
Integrating both theoretical schools in order to look for the microfounda-
tions of price rigidities in disequilibrium models seems to be a very promising 
task. An effort in this direction was made by Sneessens (1987), who assumes 
that firms operate in a monopolistically competitive economy and that they 
pre-set prices before knowing with certainty demand, capacities and labor 
supply constraints. Imposing the same conditions as Lambert on the joint 
1 Even though this literature was initially concerned with price formation in imperfectly 
competitive economies, "disequilibrium theory" is generally associated with "fix-price equi-
librium models." See Benassy (1976) in this respect. 
2This point was initially stressed by Muellbauer (1978) and Malinvaud (1980). Kooiman 
(1984) and Lambert (1988), using somewhat different approaches, were the first to give 
empirically estimable forms to this idea. 
3Sneessens and Dreze (1986) build a macroeconometric model based on Lambert's 
approach. Empirical applications to Europe indicate that demand and capacity constraints 
are both relevant in explaining economic fluctuations, implying that a mix of Keynesian 
and Classical policies is required. See Dreze and Bean (1990) in this respect. 
4 Akerloff and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw (1985) are the main references. See Blanchard 
and Fischer (1989) for a survey of this literature. 
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distribution of the stochastic shocks, Sneessens shows that the markup rate 
charged by firms depends, in addition to the price elasticity of demand, on 
"demand pressures"5. 
Building from this theoretical background, this paper tries to reproduce 
an important stilized fact of real economies: firms set prices under demand 
uncertainty while consumption decisions are taken when prices are already 
known. Under these conditions, there is place for a quantity rationing equi-
librium since preferences are revealed when prices are already set and market-
clearing can not be attained through changes in prices. "Demand heterogene-
ity" is introduced in the model to reproduce another stilized fact, namely, 
that market conditions are different among firms. The CES utility function is 
a useful instrument to introduce demand heterogeneity in a very simple way: 
the firm market shares depend linearly on some parameter of the utility func-
tion. The model is closed by a direct relation between demand heterogeneity 
and "demand uncertainty": when firms set prices, their own market shares 
are not known with certainty, even if aggregate demand and the distribution 
of market shares are common knowledge. 
The main characteristics of this economy are described in section 2. In 
Section 3 consumer behavior is formulated as an extension of the Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) model. Since markets do not necessarily clear, optimal con-
sumption decisions are derived under quantity constraints. As is standard 
in disequilibrium theory, "effective demand" is distinguished from "notional 
demand", which yields "spill-over effects": if some quantity constraints are 
binding the consumers spill their unsatisfied demands over to other markets. 
The supply side of the economy is developed in Section 4. Monopolistic 
competition and efficient bargaining allow for endogenous prices and wages. 
Demand uncertainty modifies the price behavior of firms allowing for ex-
pected demand pressures to increase the monopoly power of the firm. The 
bargaining outcome determines the labor share as a function of union power, 
and expected employment as a function of utility parameters. This result can 
be interpreted as, following the literature on wage bargaining, the "battle of 
the markups." 
The equilibrium of the aggregate economy is studied in Section 5. Since 
firms and unions are ex-ante (before the revelation of preferences) identical, 
prices and wages are the same for each firm and the aggregation problem over 
prices and wages is avoided. However, employment and production are de-
5In the same field, Licandro (1990) analyses the investment process for this type econ-
omy and Arnsperger and de la Croix (1990) formulate a general equilibrium model with 
monopolistic competition and wage bargaining. A general equilibrium analysis of monop-
olistic competition and quantity rationing is also in Benassy (1990). 
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cided ex-post (when preferences are already revealed) and both differ among 
firms. To allow for aggregation, some particular assumptions about prefer-
ences are imposed such that the "aggregation over micro markets in disequi-
librium" hypothesis holds. The main properties of the aggregate equilibrium 
are analyzed: (a) some markets are demand constrained while other markets 
are supply constrained, (b) aggregate production is smaller than aggregate 
demand and full-employment output, (c) there is (involuntary) unemploy-
ment, and (d) effective demand is greater than notional demand, implying a 
positive spill-over effect. 
2 The Economy 
There are three types of economic agents: households, unions and firms. 
Each household supplies a given quantity of labor to a particular firm, de-
mands goods and holds money. Money plays the role of numeraire and is the 
only asset in the economy. Households are represented by unions, which are 
organized at the firm level. Firms hire labor from households and produce 
differentiated goods. Firms and unions bargain at the firm level. 
A particular information structure is assumed: there are two periods 
in the model, ex-ante (before the revelation of individual preferences over 
goods) and ex-post (when all relevant information is public). Households 
supply labor and firms and unions decide (at the firm level) wages and prices 
without knowing with certainty the demand for the good produced by the 
firm. When prices and wages are public information, households demand 
goods and firms hire workers and produce. 
3 The Demand Side 
This section develops the demand side of the economy. As stated in the pre-
vious section, consumption decisions are taken ex-post when all relevant in-
formation is common knowledge. Households behave as in Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) but, as it will be showed later, markets do not necessary clear, imply-
ing that they must take into account quantity rationing constraints. 
To better understand household behavior in the goods market in this 
paper, I use the distinction, proposed by Clower (1965), between "notional 
demand" and "effective demand". "Notional demand" for a particular good 
is defined as the demand function when all rationing constraints for other 
goods are not binding. In the same sense, "effective demand" is the demand 
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function when at least some rationing constraints are binding. This distinc-
tion allows us to introduce the idea of "spill-over effect," i.e., the amount by 
which the unsatisfied demands are transfered from the constrained goods to 
the unconstrained ones. 
All of the households have the same utility function and offer the same 
given quantity of labor. However, in the labor market workers must be 
treated asymmetrically: some may find a job while others may be unem-
ployed. Revenues of households are different, even if all have the same non-
human wealth. In order to analyze the behavior of a representative consumer 
facing rationing constraints, it is convenient to assume that differences in rev-
enues do not affect optimal consumption rules. To this end, let us assume 
that "rationing schemes" are proportional, i.e., all households are rationed 
in each market proportionally to their revenues6 • 
This section is mainly concerned with the derivation of "effective de-
mand" functions for a set of differentiated goods. It will be shown that the 
distribution of the aggregate demand among goods depends, in addition to 
good's prices, on the parameters of the utility function. This property allows 
us to introduce in a endogenous way the "aggregation over micromarkets" 
assumptions proposed by Lambert (1988). 
3.1 The Representative Consumer 
The representative consumer optimization problem is 
where 
and 
subject to 
and 
Max U= - --(C) "I (M / P ) 1-"1 {C'} M , 1 -, , 'P 
1 > , > 0, () > 1 and 
n 
LPiCj +M = I 
i=l 
n 
LUi=n; 
i=l 
6 "Rationing schemes" in disequilibrium markets are analyzed by Benassy (1982). 
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(1) 
C represents the consumption of a composite good, M represents money 
holdings, P the aggregate price index, Ci and Pi are, respectively, the con-
sumption and the price of the good i, n is the number of differentiated goods, 
Si represents the quantity rationing constraint associated to the good i and 
I represents total wealth and revenues of the representative consumer. The 
quantity constraints Si are taken as given by the consumer, but they are 
endogenous variables of the model which will be determined later. As in 
monopolistically competitive models, n is assumed large enough to prevent 
changes in Pi affecting the price index p7. The parameters I, () and Uj 
Vi E {I, 2, ... , n} are given and their meaning will become clear in the next 
sections. 
As in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the utility function of the represen-
tative consumer depends on the consumption of a composite good and the 
final stock of real balances. The main differences between this paper and the 
model of Dixit and Stiglitz are: (a) consumers are not necessarily able to buy 
all they want at the given prices and (b) the weights Ui are not necessary 
unity, even if they add up to n. 
Optimality conditions for M / P and Ci are8 
PA= Cl~/)~)~ (2) 
Ci = { 
Si if Ai > 0 
( }5 ) -8 ((1 ~1{C) -8 C ~ if Ai = 0 (3) 
and 
n 
LPiCi + M = I 
i=1 
where A is the marginal value of money and Ai is the marginal value of the 
supply constraint Si. 
3.1.1 Notional Demands 
If the consumer does not face any rationing constraint (i.e., when Ai = 0 Vi) 
the solution of the optimality conditions is equivalent to that of Dixit-Stigliz. 
7In this model, the assumption of "large enough" is extended to the relation among 
quantities: changes in quantities in a particular market have not effects on aggregate 
quantities. This point will be stressed later. 
8Since the utility function is concave in its arguments and the budget and the quan-
tity constraints are linear, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for a 
maximum. 
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Demands for the composite good and real balances, which are qualified as 
"notional demands" and denoted, respectively, by Cn and Mn/ Pn, are 
and 
where 
Pn is the "notional price index"9. 
From equation (3), since Ai = 0 Vi, the "notional demand" for good i, 
denoted by di, is equivalent to the Dixit-Stiglitz solution and can be written 
as 
(4) 
The demand for the composite good, ~~, is distributed among the differen-
tiated goods depending on the relative prices and the ~ weights. 
3.1.2 Effective Demands 
As in Benassy (1982), let us define "effective demand" for good i in the 
solution to problem (1) when the i constraint is not taken into account. 
Since n is "large enough," eliminating only one constraint must not affect 
the aggregates, allowing us to use equation (3) to define the effective demand 
for all goods i, 
d· = A dn I I (5) 
where 
A= ((l_,)PC)-O PC (Pn)l-O 
,M ,f P 
(6) 
A represents the "spill-over effect". Since n is large, changes in di or Pi do 
not have significant effects on A, nor on P. When none of the quantity 
constraints is binding, or equivalently when Ai = 0 Vi, the spill-over effect is 
equal to one, implying that effective demand is identical to notional demand. 
In general A :2: 1. 
9Note that Pn is the "true" price index associated with the representative household 
utility function when the quantity constraints are not binding. 
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As stated in equation (6), the spill-over effect is not indexed by i, i.e., it 
is the same for all goods. This property depends on the particular form of 
the utility function and is very useful since we are interested in the behavior 
of the aggregates more than in the explanation of the market shares for each 
particular product. 
Let us define the "nominal aggregate effective demand" as the sum of 
money that the representative household want to spend on each good to 
realizes its effective demands, i.e., 
n 
'LdiPi = A/I. (7) 
i=1 
Dividing both sides by the aggregate price index P, the aggregate effective 
demand, denoted by D, is 
(8) 
The aggregate effective demand is the product of the spill-over effect A times 
a fraction / of real income I/ P. 
From previous equations the "effective demand" for good i can be rewrit-
ten as 
(9) 
This equation says that aggregate demand D, corrected by the ratio of 
the effective price index to the notional price index, is distributed among 
goods following the distribution of the Uj parameters and another factor 
which depends on individual prices relative to the aggregate price index. 
This property can also be analyzed by looking at the effectively demanded 
market shares. From equations (8) and (9), good i's market share is given 
by 
~~ = (;:) 1-8 :i. 
The distribution of the effectively demanded market shares among goods 
depends on the distribution of the individual prices and the distribution 
of the Uj parameters. When all prices are equal, the distribution of the 
effectively demanded market shares depend only on the distribution of the 
Ui parameters in the utility function. 
This definition of "effective demand" allows us to write the optimality 
condition (3) in an equivalent way 
(l0) 
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Optimal consumption Cj is equal to the quantity constraint Si when .\ > 0 
and equal to the effective demand di when Ai = O. 
4 The Supply Side 
As stated in the Introduction, the aim of this paper is to integrate "quan-
tity rationing" and "monopolistic competitive" models. For this purpose, 
we impose two essential assumptions that avoid market clearing. The first 
assumption is the existence of "nominal rigidities": prices and wages are de-
cided under demand uncertainty, implying that when the stochastic demand 
takes place, prices and wages are already set and no price adjustment allows 
market-clearing. Second, some assumptions are introduced to allow for "real 
rigidities", in the particular sense that each firm faces some full-employment 
constraint as an upper-bound on production. 
Labor supply, prices and wages are decided ex-ante (i.e., before the re-
alization of the stochastic demand), but labor demand and production are 
decided when the demand for goods is public information. 
In the supply side of this economy there are n monopolistically com-
petitive firms, each of them producing a variety of the unique single good. 
Workers are assumed to offer Is units (hours) of lab or to one specific firm. 
There are also n unions, which represent the workers offering their lab or to 
each firm. Let us assume the following institutional arrangement: at the 
firm level, firms and unions bargain over wages and prices under demand 
uncertainty. Assuming that the bargaining process is at the same time over 
wages and prices is equivalent to assuming that firms and unions bargain over 
wages and expected employment (efficient bargaining). This assumption is 
not essential, but the results are easier to obtain than under the alternative 
assumption that both parties bargain only over wages and prices are set by 
the firm alone lO • 
Workers are uniformly distributed among firms and Is represents the hours 
offered by the representative workerll. Another important assumption is 
added to produce real rigidities: labor markets are segmented. Each worker 
is offering his labor to a specific firm and, if a firm decides not to hire a 
10 Arnsperger and de la Croix (1990) compare both "bargaining regimes" in a very similar 
framework. 
llThe representative household solve the problem (1) in section 3.1. Because the 
marginal desutility of labor is zero, he is optimally working the maximum feasible time I •. 
Additionally, workers do not know the lab or demand for each firm and they are interested 
in to be distributed uniformly among them. 
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worker, this worker is unable to offer his labor to another firm. Under these 
assumptions each firm faces an upper-bound on production given by the 
"full-employment output," defined as 
where A is the technical coefficient for labor, which IS assumed given for 
simplicity. 
Uncertainty comes into the model because firms, unions and households 
do not know with certainty the specific Uj assigned to a particular good. This 
uncertainty disappears if all households reveal their preferences. But, if each 
particular household bears some small cost of revelation (for example, the 
cost of phoning all firms to announce his preferences), it would be interested 
in revealing its preferences only if all other households do the same, and that 
is not guaranteed in a decentralised economy. Thus, uncertainty could be 
interpreted as a "coordination failure." 
4.1 Firm Behavior 
To produce the single good has a given marginal productivity of labor: the 
inverse of the technical coefficient for lab or A. Production of a variety of 
the single good entails fixed costs, implying that each variety is produced 
by one firm only. The fixed costs are assumed equal for each variety and 
denoted by z. The zero expected profits condition determines the number 
n of differentiated goods and firms. Since n is assumed to be large, each 
firm is small so that its decisions have no significant effects on the aggregate 
outcome. 
Additionally, let us assume that the "representative firm" forms its ex-
pectations rationally. It knows the "effective demand function" (equation 
(10)) assigned to its particular variety. Aggregate effective demand and the 
distribution of the Uj'S are common knowledge, but the representative firm 
does not know its own Uj with certainty. 
Nominal and real rigidities imply that ex-post optimal production is given 
by the minimum of the two constraints, those of effective demand and full-
employment output: 
(11 ) 
Expected profits are therfore 
( 12) 
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where z represents the fixed costs of differentiation. The monopolistic com-
petitive assumption imposes that E( 7ri) = 0, and allows us to determine the 
number of firms. 
The next important point is the determination of E(yd. The full-employment 
constraint is given and the effective demand function di comes from equation 
(10). Since n is large, let us assume that the histogram of the parameters Ui 
can be approximated by a lognormal density function. This additional re-
striction on preferences allows us to employ some useful results from "quan-
tity rationing theory". Under the assumption that Ui follows a lognormal 
distribution, expected production can be approximated by a CES function 
of expected demand and the full-employment constraint12 
1 
E(yd = (E(dd- P + y?fr; , (13) 
where p depends on the variance of the distribution of the Ui parameters 
and is positive for plausible values of this variance13 . In particular, when 
there is no uncertainty, i.e., when the variance goes to zero, the parameter 
p -4 00, implying that expected production is equal to the minimum of 
expected demand and full-employment output. This is equivalent to the 
standard monopolistic competitive model, where Ui = 1 Vi. 
From equation (14) we can calculate the elasticity of expected production 
to expected demand, denoted by cl>d, as 
cl> = (E(Yd)P < 1 
d E(d
i
) _. (14) 
This elasticity is smaller than one and decreases when expected demand 
increases. cl> d is also a measure of the probability of excess supply (or demand 
constraint) . 
Before solving the bargaining outcome, let us analyze the behavior of the 
firm when the labor market is competitive and prices are set under demand 
uncertainty14. The firm maximizes expected profits, given by equation (12), 
subject to expected production, given by equation (13). The optimal price 
12See Lambert for a proof. 
13More precisely 
2 f( -(1 /2) 
P = -1 + ~ F(-(1/2) 
where F is the standard normal distribution function, f is the standard normal density 
function and (1 is the standard deviation of the distribution of the Ui parameters. The 
standard deviation of demand must have (1 ~ 1.2 which allows p to be smaller than one. 
14See Snesseens (1987). 
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rule is 
( 
1 ) -1 
----;-1- A Wi· 
1--i1 <I'd 
Pi = ( 15) 
Prices are a markup over marginal lab or cost, with market power equal to the 
demand elasticity () times the elasticity of expected production to expected 
demand <Pd. The main difference from standard theory comes from the ex-
istence of demand uncertainty: the market power of the firm is increased by 
the non-zero probability of an excess supply. 
Ex-post, when demand is revealed, production is given by equation (11). 
If the demand shock is "good" the firm produces at the full-employment level 
and if the demand shock is "bad" the firm is not able to hire all its labor 
supply and some workers are unemployed in this particular market. 
Finally, let us assume that the firm has a fall-back level equal to minus 
the fixed costs z. If there is not agreement, the firm loses its investment in 
the diversification technology, i.e., the fixed cost z. 
4.2 Union Behavior 
In each market, a trade union represents the workers offering their labor to 
the firm producing the corresponding variety. Let us assume that the "repre-
sentative union" has the same information as the "representative firm" and 
forms its expectations rationally. It knows the "effective demand function" 
(equation (10)) assigned to the variety i. Aggregate effective demand and 
the distribution of the Uj'S are common knowledge, but the representative 
union does not know with certainty the Ui faced by the ith firm. 
Total wealth and revenues of the representative member of the union i 
are 
n 
I · - M- . + W,[' + '" ().Jr ,- 1 " ~ IJ J' 
j=1 
where Mi M represents initial money holdings, li is employment and 
()ij = ()j represents the shares of firm j held by the ith worker. Since the 
number of households is large, ()j is small, implying that the ith union do not 
care about the profits of the ith firm. The objective function of the union is 
(16) 
where V IS the indirect utility function of the risk-neutral representative 
12 
member after the deduction of the fall-back level. The fall-back level is 
i.e., the non-human wealth. 
4.3 The Bargaining Outcome 
The institutional arrangement is that the representative firm and the repre-
sentative union bargain, at the level of the firm, over both prices and wages, 
or equivalently over expected employment and wages. The outcome of this 
bargaining process is the solution of the Nash product 
where 1 > /3 > 0 represents the "union power" and 1 - /3 the "firm power" 
in the labor market. E(yd is given by equation (13). 
The optimality conditions for prices and wages are therefore 
( 
1 )-1 Pi = _ i!..=Ql A Wi 
1 e~d 
(18) 
and 
(19) 
Equation (18) states that the firm (in agreement with the union) sets a 
markup over marginal costs. The monopoly power in the goods market is 
given by the inverse of the demand elasticity () weighted by the elasticity 
of expected production to expected demand 4>d. Since the latter elasticity 
is smaller than one, it reinforces the power of the firm in the market: as 
stated by equation (15), 4> d could be interpreted as a measure of "demand 
pressures." However, since the union cares about expected employment, the 
monopoly power of the firm is weighted by its power in the labor market. 
When the union has no power at all (/3 = 0), the "Lerner index" is given by 
the monopoly power only. 
Equation (19) could be interpreted as the union and the firm bargaining 
over the labor share, i.e., ~. At the optimum, this share is equal to union 
power, implying that the greater this power is, the greater the share of total 
revenues appropriated by workers will be. 
13 
Equations (18) and (19) are linearly dependent on prices and wages, im-
plying that the lab or share must be equal in both equations. This is possible 
because the monopoly power in equation (18) adjusts until the labor share 
becomes equal to /3. Equalizing the labor share from both equations implies 
1 
<l>d = 0' (20) 
where <l>d is defined in equation (14). From (14) and (20) the expected 
unemployment rate, denoted by E( vd, can be determined as 
(
0 - 1) ~ E(Vi) = 1 - -0- (21 ) 
This implies that in the negotiation process both parties are mainly interested 
in their own share of total revenues and in expected (un )employment. 
From equations (13), (14), (19) and (20) the negotiated price and wage 
can be solved as functions of the aggregate effective demand D, the aggregate 
price index P and the aggregate full-employment output Yf = n Yf. They 
depend also on the parameters 0 and p. 
5 The Aggregate Economy and Equilibrium Conditions 
The assumptions on a representative consumer, a representative firm and a 
representative union allow us to define some aggregates in a very straightfor-
ward manner. The only difference among agents comes from the distribution 
of demand among goods: that is, the distribution of the Ui parameters. 
Since prices and wages are set before the firm (and the union) knows its 
own position in the effective demand distribution, all firms and unions agree 
on the same prices and wages. Formally, Pi = P* Vi and Wi = W* Vi. From 
equations (IS) and (19), the aggregate price pIS and the aggregate wage W 
are, at equilibrium, given by 
P* = (1 _ 1 - (3) -1 W* A-I 
0<1>* , d 
(22) 
and 
W* = /3 AP*. (23) 
15It is assumed that the aggregate price is a weighted sum of individual prices, which is in 
accord with the standard Paasche and Laspeyres index. However, since the representative 
household is rationed in some markets the "true price index" should include the "shadow 
prices" for the constrained goods. See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). 
14 
Taking into account that at equilibrium the aggregate price index has the 
property that P = P* = P;, the equilibrium values of aggregate production 
and aggregate effective demand are, respectively, Y* = n E(yd and D* = 
n E( dd. The elasticity of aggregate production to aggregate effective demand 
is, from equation (15), 
* - (Y*)P <Pd - -
D* 
(24) 
As stated before, each firm produces the minimum of effective demand 
and full-employment output. This implies that the appropriate supply con-
straints for the representative consumer are Si = YJ Vi. The equilibrium in 
the market for variety i is defined by the following condition: Ci = Yi, where 
Yj = min{ dj, YJ}. Following Lambert, at the equilibrium, the aggregates are 
I 
C* = Y* = (D*-P + YiP)-p (25) 
where C* is aggregate consumption, Y* is aggregate production, D* is aggre-
gate effective demand and YJ is the aggregate full-employment output. The 
parameter p is the same as in equation (14). Aggregate production is aCES 
function of aggregate effective demand and full-employment output. From 
equations (6) and (8), the equilibrium value of aggregate effective demand 
D* is given by 
D* = (A )~ = ((I_,)P*Y*)-O y 
, P* ,M ' (26) 
since p; = P*. Aggregate effective demand is a proportion A, 2: , of 
total real incomes. Since it is assumed that there is no money growth, the 
equilibrium in the money market implies M* = M. 
The equilibrium for this economy, summarized in equations (22) to (26), 
shows some interesting properties. 
Property 1 The unemployment rate is generally positive and equal to the 
expected unemployment rate given by equation {21}. 
The "battle of the mark-ups" implicit in equations (22) and (23) deter-
mines the equilibrium value for <Pd, 
<Pd = ~, (27) 
and from equations (24) and (25) the unemployment rate at the equilibrium 
IS 
* (e-l)~ v =1- --e ' 
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which in general is positive. Note that aggregate unemployment is equal to 
expected unemployment, given by equation (21). 
There is full employment only in two extreme cases: if there is perfect 
competition, i.e., if () ~ 00; or if there is no uncertainty, i.e., if p ~ 00. 
Property 2 Because households are unable to coordinate and reveal thier 
preferences, the economy faces demand uncertainty and is unable to attain 
full- employment equilibrium. 
From equations (24), (25) and (27), the equilibrium values of aggregate 
production and aggregate effective demand can be derived as 
( ()-1)~ Y* = -()- Yj ~ Yj , and 1 D* = (() -l)pyj . (28) 
Aggregate production is generally smaller than full-employment output, 
which is consistent with a positive unemployment rate. The relation between 
aggregate effective demand and full-employment output depends crucially 
on the paramete·r (). In the particular case when () = 2, aggregate effective 
demand is equal to the full-employment output, but both are greater than 
production. This has an interesting interpretation: since some markets are in 
excess supply and other markets are in excess demand, aggregate production 
is always smaller than full-employment output, even if the latter is equal to 
aggregate effective demand. 
Note that when there is no uncertainty, and p ~ 00, the economy is at 
full-employment equilibrium. Uncertainty is essential for our result: since 
households are unable to coordinate and reveal their preferences, the econ-
omy faces demand uncertainty and is unable to attain their full-employment 
equilibrium. When uncertainty is removed, i.e., when households reveal their 
preferences, "nominal rigidities" disappear and "real rigidities" are irrelevant. 
Property 3 A quantity theory of money is implicit in the model, with a 
velocity of money depending on the preferences parameters, and () and on 
the uncertainty parameter p. 
From equations (26) and (27) It can be shown that 
P*Y* = l' M. 
()8ii(1 -,) 
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This is a simple version of the quantity theory of money, where the velocity of 
money depends on the preference parameters, and () and on the uncertainty 
parameter p. When there is no uncertainty, i.e., as p goes to infinity, the 
firms satisfy demand, implying that our result is the same as in the standard 
"monopolistic competition model." 16 
Since Y* is defined in equation (28), the equilibrium solution to the price 
index P* is 
Property 4 Effective consumption at equilibrium is smaller than notional 
consumption. 
Equilibrium aggregate spending is 
P* C* = ( , ) 1* < 1* < I 1 _, _, n, 
OBP(l -I) +, 
where In represents notional wealth and revenues and it follows: In = M + 
PnYj . 
Because households are constrained in some markets they are consum-
ing less than in the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibrium, even if they spill unsatisfied 
consumptions over to markets with excess supply. This arise from the combi-
nation of two convergent reasons: (1) people spend less than a proportion, of 
total wealth and revenues on the composite good, and (2) revenues are smaller 
than notional revenues because production is smaller than full-employment 
output. These differences disappear when there is no uncertainty or no prod-
uct differentiation. 
Property 5 At t equilibrium the representative household saves more than 
a proportion (1 -,) of total wealth and revenues, and the marginal value of 
money is smaller than the inverse of the price index. 
This is the reverse of Property 4. Equilibrium money holdings are 
16 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989). 
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This result is consistent with the result that, at the equilibrium, the marginal 
value of money ,\ is lower than the inverse of the price index P*, 
Property 6 The representative consumer "spills-over" from the constrained 
demands to the non-constrained ones. 
The equilibrium value for the spill-over effect is 
{}~ 
A*= 1 >l. 
(}e p (1 -,) +, 
6 Conclusions and Remarks 
The behavior of households under monopolistic competition in the Dixit-
Stiglitz framework is extended to a situation in which quantity constraints 
could be binding. Under these conditions, the distinction between "notional 
demand" and "effective demand" is shown to be relevant to the analyses 
of consumer behavior and market equilibrium. "Demand heterogeneity" is 
introduced through weights in the CES utility function, and is related to "de-
mand uncertainty." Since households do not reveal their preferences before 
prices are public information, from the firm point of view demand uncertainty 
is the consequence of demand heterogeneity. In an imperfectly competitive 
economy, with nominal and real rigidities, demand uncertainty is the main 
explanation of quantity rationing in the goods market and unemployment. 
Given the difficulties of working with quantity constraints, the model 
presented in this paper introduced some important simplifying assumptions. 
First, since the model is static, firms are inhibited to learn about their own 
demand. To build a dynamic model of this type is not a very easy task, since 
households must take into account all future quantity constraints. However, 
it seems possible to reproduce the main results of this paper in an Overlap-
ping Generation Model, where agents live for two periods. This will yield a 
better understanding of how households transfer constrained demands over 
time and how firms learn about their own demand. Second, the results in 
this paper are closely related to the assumption of ~~real rigidities," mainly 
caused by "labor market segmentation." Modelling the obstacles to labor 
mobility seems to be an important improvement. A third point is related 
to welfare considerations: the price index is defined as a weighted sum of 
18 
the observed prices, but it is not necessarily the "true price index." Finally, 
an interesting extension of the model would be to study "open economies:" 
domestic quantity rationing could be spilled over to foering goods and affect 
both the current account and the exchange rate. 
19 
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